The events leading to the declaration of state of emergency in Nepal on November 26 indicate several things. One, democracy has finally broken down, and the final seal was, ironically, the recommendation of an elected government. Second, the Maoists, who initiated the armed insurgency in 1996, perceive that they are powerful enough to tackle the military. Before the late November actions, they had not attacked the army. Three, emergency declaration is an indication that even the government feels that the Maoists have become powerful. Four, the state, that claims to be democratic, is depending considerably on the army to restore its supremacy within its territory. Five, a civil war may have begun.

The state of emergency was declared after the Maoists unilaterally broke off the dialogue and launched attacks in different parts of the country, causing heavy casualty on the government side. The state of emergency has to be approved by a two third majority of the House of Representative (HR) within three months. After that it can be in force for six months. The HR can further extend it to six more months. The emergency has suspended the freedom of opinion and expression, freedom to assembly peacefully and without arms, freedom of movement, press and publication right, right against preventive detention, and right to information, property, privacy and constitutional remedy. How has such a situation come about within 12 years after democracy was restored? What are the implications for democracy, the country, and the people?

The declaration of emergency has brought visible relief to sections of the society harassed by the Maoists such as the business and industry, the private boarding school entrepreneurs, and people living with the threats of the Maoists. However, the overall consequences of it may be more negative. Political rights and civil liberties were a few positive facets of the democratic regime in the last decade. With the declaration of an emergency, even these basic rights are threatened. If the declaration of emergency and the military deployment could guarantee the eventual restoration of law and order and an end to the insurgency, then the people might be willing to bear the momentary difficulties. However, there is no guarantee of that.

If we are to go by the trends of the last decade when more power in any institution, agency or individual generally meant more and frequent abuse of it, the concentration of power through the emergency decree may mean the increased chances of more power abuse in the coming days. Blunders committed by the rulers and the frustration of the people over power abuse for individual, family, community and partisan interests, and the system’s inability to check them, also contributed to the rapid the growth of the Maoists. More power abuse and blunders in the coming days might further help the Maoists.

Some of the actions during and after the declaration of the emergency suggest such misguided tendencies. The emergency could have been limited to the affected areas, and accordingly its negative consequences could have been limited. Likewise, formation of a national government consisting of all political parties would have enhanced consensus and such a government would have been in a better position to address the crises more effectively. The restrictions on publications imposed by the Ministry of Information and Communication, on the other hand, is an example of government attitude that might backfire on it. The restrictions not only target the Maoists but the social justice movements, which have increased dramatically in the last decade, as well. The directive restricts publication of materials that deal with "castes, communities, religions, classes and regions" and "caste, language, and culture." Such restrictions may further alienate the minorities, who are fighting against caste, language, religious, and cultural inequalities, and may push some of them into the Maoist arms.

The government’s over reliance on the army for solving the Maoist problem is misguided. The army is trained to fight wars where enemies are clearly identified. They are not trained for fighting with insurgents who mix and sometimes live among the people. Furthermore, the extremely difficult terrain of the countryside can hinder mobilization of the army and restrict their effectiveness. While the politicians sound optimistic about the ability of the army to control the insurgency, the security personnel do not exude such confidence.

Even if the army can temporarily halt or eliminate the Maoists, the insurgency may revive once the army deployment is recalled. The Maoist insurgency, first, is a political problem. Unless the causes of the insurgency are addressed, possibilities of insurgencies, Maoists or other variations, will remain. The solution is to address the structural inequalities in economic, political, cultural and social arenas. The army, at the most, can be a part of an overall strategy. The security forces can be effective in repressing extremists within the movement after some of them join the mainstream politics, and after support for the insurgency dwindles in the society. For this scenario, some sort of political settlement is required. By labeling the Maoists as terrorists, the government has created obstacles for the resumption of dialogue.

The failure of the army to eliminate the Maoist insurgency, on the other hand, does not mean that the Maoists will overrun the military. As of now, the Maoists do not have these kinds of resources. Their large-scale attacks have taken place during the night and they have mobilized manpower from several districts to launch such raids. Even though they have declared many Peoples’ Governments, they do not control any of the district headquarters. The Maoists have formed governments in rural areas where the government has fallen back. In the district headquarters where the government has chosen to stay, the Maoists have not succeeded in taking control. The failure of the military to eliminate the Maoists may mean existence of two states within a country and a protracted civil war.

Recent reports have attributed loss inflicted by the army on the Maoists side. However, since the press is under censorship, especially with regard to the insurgency news, the veracity of some of the news is questionable. The news seems to have given the people some sense of respite, especially in the Kathmandu valley. Even if the killing by the army is closer to the truth, problems, however, may surface. Prior to 1998, the police presumably killed more Maoists than the Maoists killed the police. However, despite the killings the Maoists grew by leap and bound. The killings necessarily did not lead to their decline! And if innocent people are killed, it may, in fact, even create further support for the Maoists by demonstrating the abuse of power by the state.

Cross-national studies have found that inequality is an important cause for political violence. Muller and Seligson (1987), based on a study of more than 60 countries, found that inequality brews political violence in a broader context of governmental act of coercion, intensity for separatism, level of economic development, and lack of effective political participation in the decision-making processes.

Nepal faces extreme inequality in resources distribution. In 1991, Kathmandu had an average life expectancy of 74.4 years whereas Mugu, a mountain district in the far west, had only 37.4 years (Thapa 1995). The Maoists strongholds are economically depressed with low life expectancy, literacy and access to resources. Political inequality is reflected by the absence of power at the local government level. Political participation for the citizens has been limited to casting votes in the elections. Other inequalities, such as ethnic/caste, regional and gender, have supplemented the class based inequality to aggravate the situation.

Inequality existed in the country prior to 1990 but since then the open environment has provided opportunities for expressing grievances. It increased the perception of inequality. In such a situation, the mismanagement of the country aggravated the condition. The widespread repression of the Maoists cadres in the early 1990s in their stronghold of Rolpa and Rukum by the administration under the Nepali Congress (NC) may have become the push factor for the Maoists, who did participate in the first parliamentary election, for initiating the insurgency.

The Maoists’ strength is their underground nature and nighttime operations, which conceals their identity and limits the choices of the government and its opponents. Since people do not know who the Maoists are, they abide by their threats. Another Maoists strength is the willingness of its cadres to die for the cause.

Radical cadres of other communist parties have provided a ready pool of ideologically compatible recruits for the Maoists. Recently the Maoists have attracted a large-scale cadre influx from the main opposition party CPN-UML. Earlier it was the CPN-ML and other small communist parties who had suffered defections of their cadres.

Governance problems have also contributed in the growth of the Maoists. The people have not received much relief in the last decades. Unemployment among the youth, leading to frustration and desperation, has attracted a substantial number of youths to the insurgency. Widespread corruption has increased the distrust of the people toward the government. Dramatic changes in the living style of the many leaders within a decade, and the failure of the anti-corruption agencies to act against them has reinforced the distrust.

The lack of social reforms has led to high participation of some of the discriminated groups in the insurgency. High involvement of the janajati (indigenous/nationalities/ethnic groups) and women has been observed. Reports also claim increasing amount of dalit participation. The Maoists have raised the issues of the janajati and women, such as the issues of self-determination, cultural and regional autonomy, and linguistic, religious, and gender equality, more vociferously than any of the mainstream political parties. They have formed several ethnic liberation fronts. Close observers of the movement attest that the party has a higher number of janajati and dalit members in the leadership compared to other mainstream parties. However, the formal social-cultural and political associations of the janajati are suspicious of the Maoists. They feel that the janajati are being exploited in the name of a revolution, which is again led by the ‘Bahuns.’

By giving a significant role in the movement to the women, the Maoists have changed gender dynamics significantly in the regions of their influence. Interestingly, the Maoist documents and programs are not as much targeted toward the dalit, as one would have expected, given that the mainstream society considers the group to be the most oppressed. Among groups who perceive as being discriminated, the Maoists have not raised the madhesi issues significantly. Nor do they have influence in the madhesi-dominated areas in the Terai.

The failure to empower the local governments has also benefited the Maoists. The Lack of power in the local governments meant that they did not develop into viable institutions of governance, development, welfare and security of the people. The local governments were weak and did not offer any resistance. They simply collapsed at the threat of the Maoists.

The blunders of the administration have allowed the Maoists to consolidate. Once the Maoists began attacking the rural police posts and government offices, the state removed them from those areas. The shrinking of the state has facilitated the growth of the Maoists. The Maoists filled the void created by the departure of the state agencies.

While the government has committed numerous blunders, the Maoists have to date even avoided the fatal Nepali communist disease: internecine fighting and splits (Neupane 2001, Khadka 1995). The insurgency, and the necessity of fighting a larger enemy, may have kept them united. It is hard to say with certainty, due to their underground nature and extreme secrecy, what sorts of factions exist within the movement. However, one cannot rule out splits in the future. The splits will in all likelihood focus around moderate/extreme positions toward issues such as republic, democracy, and India, in addition to continuation of the armed insurgency or compromising with the government. Creating and/or increasing divisions within the insurgency might be a fruitful strategy for the government. For this, however, the government has to be ready to meet some of the demands that are acceptable to the moderates.

Extreme power hunger among the leaders is one of the underlying factors for governance crises. In their quest for attaining and holding on to power at any cost, the leaders have flouted democratic norms and abused power. Twelve governments in the last twelve years is a manifestation of power hunger among leaders. The desire to confine power within one’s party has led to opportunities being squandered. The current government thought that the situation had deteriorated enough to declare an emergency but never seriously considered forming an all-party national government to face the crises. The UML would have been useful cabinet partner for tackling the Maoists because they understand the strategies, tools, and psyche of the Maoists leaders and cadres. Additionally, a coalition at the center would have facilitated coalitions at the local level among the various political party cadres to resist the Maoists. Despite these potential benefits of a national government, the NC seems reluctant to share power with other political parties, even at the moment of crises. The lack of inclusion of the other political parties in the dialogue with the Maoists and the lack of consultation with them in the declaration of the emergency indicates the government’s obsession with confining power to itself.

Even the current deadlock in the dialogue between the government and the Maoists is related to power hunger. The demand for the Constitutional Assembly is essentially a demand for distributing power more widely. The resistance to form the Constitutional Assembly is, in effect, a denial of that demand.

Excessive centralization is perhaps the most important underlying factor for birth and growth of the Maoists. It alienated the people from the state and provided the environment for the abuse of power, leading to the governance problem, which in turn aggravated the situation.

A recent public opinion survey revealed that only 19 percent of the people consider the Maoists activities to be one of the three important problems in the country (Himal Association 2001). This is despite the leaders, intelligentsia and the journalists crying hoarse that it is the major problem. This shows that the common people hold different views than those who govern the country, indicating serious level of alienation.

The centralization of the state, an element of which is the rule of the periphery through the Chief District Officers (CDO) and the police, has alienated the population because the administrators are accountable to the center and not to the people. They implement the center’s policy and are not sensitive to the needs of the local people. The growth of the Maoists insurgency is related to the alienation. There is lack of support of the people to the administration. There have been rare reports of the administration being pre-warned of the Maoists attacks by the people. The Maoists gather in hundreds, and sometimes in thousands, from different districts for the attacks. These large gatherings are very conspicuous in the sparsely populated hill villages. However, the administration seems to be unaware of them. This indicates that the people are not relaying information to the administration.

If the local administration had been under the local governments, then they would have probably received more local support. Leaders with local contacts and familiarity with local specificities would have been in a better position to address the Maoists challenges than the administration headed by bureaucrats deputed for short periods. The political parties and cadres of the local governing party would have supported the administration as well.

Centralization has alienated different minority groups because the center, overwhelmingly dominated by the dominant group, has formulated policies that are harmful to them. The absence of autonomy and self-governance rights has compounded the problems because the regionally concentrated ethnic groups are deprived of opportunities for making policies that benefit them.

In addition to the alienation of the people, centralization has facilitated and tolerated the abuse of power. Since power is so centralized in the executive, leaders know that once they control it they can get away with whatever they do. A culture of attaining power and holding on to it at any cost has developed. Excessive power to the executive has resulted into it running unchecked. Due to the lack of check on the executive from other central agencies, horizontal accountability is weak in Nepal. Horizontal accountability has not worked because the executive through nomination, and budgetary and administrative control influences the constitutional and central agencies that are supposed to keep watch on it. The result has been that the people in the executive have gotten away with whatever they have done. For example, the powerful NC ministers and leaders have rarely been charge-sheeted by the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA). Everyone agrees that there is widespread corruption. Since the NC has ruled the country for more than 80 percent of the time after 1990, a large number of NC leaders are involved in corruption. However, the NC, as the ruling party for most of the years, has packed the agency with its people. The result is that there are no investigations against its powerful leaders.

Power centralization at the executive level is so great that even the judiciary and legislative branches have complained about their undue dependence on the executive. On the one hand, centralization has constrained the horizontal accountability agencies from performing their duties, while on the other, in absence of checks, the culture of power abuse has grown. Ministers have frankly and publicly admitted misdeeds but no actions have been taken against them.

Some Maoists watchers feared that the Maoists had participated in the dialogue to buy time for regrouping and training the large number of cadres who had recently joined the insurgency. This sounds plausible now but it can never be fully ascertained because the Maoists had good reasons to break off the dialogue. Despite dropping their major demand for a republic, the government was not flexible to their other demands. The government asked the Maoists to drop all its major demands and participate in elections. It was wishful thinking on the part of the government to assume that the insurgents, who had been waging insurgency and making great strides in increasing their support base and influence, would drop all their demands at the request of the government they have been considering as an enemy.

The government rejected the Maoists demand for a Constitution Assembly outright. However, they have not provided sound reasons for such a rejection. Many political parties, human rights groups, social critics, and janajati, madhesi and women activists and organizations have identified various flaws in the Constitution. In this background, what is wrong with forming a Constitution Assembly for drafting a more democratic Constitution?

The claim that the 1990 Constitution was made by the people, and hence there is no need to draft a new Constitution, is not entirely correct. The 1990 Constitution is a compromise document between the leaders of the restoration of democracy movement and the palace (Hacchethu 1994). Many of the suggestions provided to the Constitution Recommendation Commission (CRC) by the people were disregarded whereas the cabinet made crucial revisions to the CRC draft.

The democratic forces need not fear a Constitution Assembly because the people’s wishes will prevail through it. The people and political parties overwhelmingly favor democracy. Once the Maoists come ‘over the ground,’ their influence will be not as large as it is now. The campus student elections showed that the Maoists are not a big force even in the sector from where the communists have traditionally drawn their support and cadres. The majority of the political parties and the people are also not for a republic. There is no need for the palace to worry. However, rationale reasoning does not seem to matter to the rulers who seem to be concerned with being in power at any cost.

If the Maoist growth trend continues, no one can outright deny that the Maoists will not be in a better position of bargaining in the future. The democratic forces may slide down to a position from where they may have to accept more of the Maoists demands. It will also be a time of threat for the palace.

A Constitution Assembly is needed because it will encourage the Maoists leadership to join the electoral politics. They can rationalize to their cadres for accepting the mandate of the people. However, the most important reason for having a Constitution Assembly is that it will incorporate peoples’ wishes.

In many democratizing countries changes have been made in the Constitution to consolidate transitions. The US Constitution, which is highly acclaimed for its democratic spirit, was a result of the second attempt after a decade of the failure of the first one, the Articles of Federation. The experience of the last decade has shown the need for vast amendments or a new Constitution in Nepal. The Constitution should incorporate the following issues.

Power should be truly devolved or divided among regions/districts. Decentralization, as it is understood in Nepal, is not enough. In certain areas, such as development and education, the local bodies should have final jurisdiction. The police and local administration should be under the regional/district governments. It is a well-established fact that federalism is the best devolution method for a culturally diverse society like Nepal. Recent theories have shown that market-preserving federalism also ensures economic development because of diffusion of political power provides favorable conditions for capital investment and protection (Weingast 1995).

Horizontal accountability should be ensured. Vertical accountability through election has not been sufficient to ensure accountability. Constitutional bodies and other central agencies should be independent from the executive so that they can perform their duty of checking each other and the executive. These agencies can be made accountable through other mechanisms but not through executive supervision.

The issues of the janajati, madhesi, dalit and women should be addressed. The discriminatory provisions in the Constitution toward these groups should be removed. Otherwise, the janajati and madhesi groups have potential to be disruptive in the future. Other difficult questions should be deliberated long and hard. Only such deliberations will bring about compromises that may be acceptable to more people.

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